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Are Betting Markets E¢ cient?




This article investigates the degree of e¢ ciency of the European Football online bet-
ting market by using odds quoted by 12 bookmakers on 21 European championships over
11 years. We show that systematically picking out odds inferior to a threshold delivers
a rate of return of 4.45% if best odds are selected across bookmakers and 2.78% if mean
odds are used. This amounts to backing overwhelmingly favourites whose probability of
winning exceeds 90%. Our results only exploit information contained in odds, are robust
to the use of real-time data and di¤erent sample periods and hold under risk neutrality
and expected utility preferences for realistic degrees of risk aversion. Transaction costs
reduce protability but only for small stake bets.
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1 I. Introduction
Online betting markets are a ourishing industry that has been gaining in popularity world-
wide for the last decade. All sorts of sport events can be bet on, and attractive redistribution
rates are o¤ered, sometimes greater than 90 percent. Betting markets also provide an inter-
esting eld to scholars who study the working of information markets and implications for
participants risk preferences and degree of rationality. By o¤ering bets whose payo¤s are
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contingent to the occurrence of uncertain sporting events, betting markets produce informa-
tion about the likelihood of these events in a way similar to how nancial markets aggregate
information about future and uncertain assets payo¤s. A natural way to investigate the
functioning of betting markets is consequently to study their information e¢ ciency.
Markets are e¢ cient if prices reect information to the point where the marginal benet
of acting on information does not exceed marginal costs (Jensen, 1978). This property can
be tested by checking that the use of historical prices does not yield abnormal returns (Fama,
1970). Market e¢ ciency has been originally formulated for nancial markets but applies in a
natural way to betting markets where asset prices are replaced by betting odds. Weak-form
e¢ ciency requires that bettors cannot earn a risk-adjusted better return or undergo a smaller
loss by selecting a class of bets on the basis of their odds. Semi-strong-form e¢ ciency tests
expand the information set to all types of public information like teamspast performance or
whether they benet from home advantage.
A related and crucial issue is whether the best rules identied deliver a positive return.
A mere rate of return di¤erential between alternative betting rules invalidates the informa-
tion revelation property of betting markets but does not necessarily challenge participants
rationality whose motivation to chase better return is weakened by the absence of protable
opportunities. To the contrary, the presence of protable rules that are not arbitraged away
strongly challenges the hypothesis of rational behaviour which is key to the existence of e¢ -
cient markets. Conditions under which a protable betting rule is proved to exist are however
stringent. The computed excess return should be positive with a su¢ cient level of condence.
It should not depend on unrealistic assumptions about risk preferences and transaction or
information costs. Last, the betting rule should be based on readily observable information,
2
robust to out-of-sample testing, and simple enough so that a large number of bettors may be
able to detect and exploit it.
This article investigates the degree of weak-form e¢ ciency of betting markets by analyzing
the statistical relationship between odds and return in the European Football online betting
market, which is the most developed market in Europe. The data cover 21 championships
played in 11 European countries over a period of 11 years (2000-2011). Each year, odds
of home wins, away wins and draws posted by 6 to 10 online bookmakers, depending on
the years, are recorded. Overall, the dataset includes 79,446 football matches and around
1,800,000 betting odds. Our data are an order of magnitude larger than any other dataset
previously examined in online betting markets. We show that systematically picking out
betting odds inferior to a threshold delivers a rate of return of 4.45% if best odds are selected
across bookmakers and 2.78% if mean odds are used. Annualized rates of return are 106%
and 52% respectively. This amounts to backing overwhelmingly favourites whose probability
of winning exceeds 90%. These results only exploit information contained in odds, do not
rely on complex econometric models, and are robust to out-of sample tests and di¤erent
risk preferences assumptions. Transaction costs are shown to reduce protability but only
for small stake bets. Overall, the evidence indicates that protable opportunities are not
exploited away by bettors and that bookmakers do not set odds in a rational way.
The paper is linked to the literature that documents the presence of a favourite-longshot
bias in betting markets (see Sorensen and Ottaviani (2008) for a survey). This bias refers to
the observation that the expected return on longshot bets (or bets on outsiders) tends to be
systematically lower than on favourite bets. It is mostly observed in racetrack betting data
(Snowberg and Wolfers, forthcoming). Our data reveals the presence of a favourite-longshot
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bias in the European Football Championships although the relationship between odds and
return is noisier than in racetrack betting data. Hence the result that backing outcomes with
the shortest odds is a protable strategy can be seen as the exploitation of a favourite-longshot
bias.
There are however important di¤erences with previous results found in racetrack betting
data. First, horse racing betting markets are pari-mutuel, that is the money bet on all
outcomes is pooled and then shared proportionally among those who picked the winning
outcome. Under this sharing rule, a favourite-longshot bias means that bettors tend to
underbet on favourites and to overbet on longshots. Hence, deviations from market e¢ ciency
could only be attributable to bettors behaviour. The European Football betting market
is not pari-mutuel but a xed-odds market in which bookmakers set odds several days in
advance and then rarely change them during the betting period. Since they do not balance
the books, odds do not reect supply and demand for each bet. If bettors tend to overbet on
longshots, bookmakers may take advantage of this bias by skewing odds against outsiders.1
Hence a decreasing function between odds and return may come from optimal pricing by
bookmakers dealing with bettors characterized by a favourite-longshot bias.
Second, although existing studies generally nd that backing favourites yields a better
return than betting on outsiders, they do not document prot opportunities, contrary to
our study. This is true in horse racing (Snowberg and Wolfers, forthcoming) and in other
sports as well. After a comprehensive review of the literature on sport forecasting in horse
racing and several team sports, Stekler et al. (2010) come to the conclusion that there is no
evidence that either statistical systems or experts consistently outperform the market. Our
1Levitt (2004) provides evidence that bookmakers are better at predicting games outcomes than bettors
in the American National Football League gambling market, and exploit this advantage by distorting odds.
4
article reaches a di¤erent conclusion by showing that a simple betting rule is able to beat
bookmakersodds.
Many empirical studies dedicated to European Football betting markets have developed
forecasting models that serve as a basis to the elaboration of betting strategies (Pope and
Peel, 1989, Cain, Law, and Peel, 2000, Kuypers, 2000, Dixon and Pope, 2004, Asimakopoulos
and Goddard, 2004, Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007). Some of these articles suggest protable
yet fragile betting opportunities. In particular, they rely on complex statistical models and
lack the kind of robustness tests performed in this study. None of them provide evidence
of protable rules based solely on odds. The main reason why previous studies have failed
to uncover the availability of odd-based protable rules is that they focus on one or a few
championships observed during one or a few seasons and consequently dispose of a relatively
small database. Our dataset is on average ten times larger than theirs and allows us to assess
the protability of betting strategies involving infrequent bets with high accuracy2 .
The result that a simple and protable price-based betting rule is left unexploited is also
of interest for the e¢ ciency literature in nance. There is an ongoing debate whether return
anomalies are genuine deviations from market e¢ ciency (see e.g. Shleifer (2000) and Schwert
(2003) for two contrasting views). A wealth of empirical studies has failed to bring forth
a consensus about this issue. One major reason is that tests of market e¢ ciency rely on a
particular asset-pricing model. Hence deviations from e¢ ciency can always be rejected on the
ground that the theoretical model at hand is inadequate. E¢ ciency tests in betting markets
face the same di¢ culty, but require a much simpler model of asset returns. Bets have only two
payo¤s delivered a few days forward so that time is not an issue. The probability of winning
2As a comparison, Kuypers (2000) exploit 3,382 matches in his study, Dixon and Pope (2004) 6,629 matches
and Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) 8,144 matches, whereas the present dataset comprises 79,446 matches.
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is easier to estimate than the stochastic behaviour of nancial assets. If any, betting markets
have also a better chance of being e¢ cient as betting is a repeated activity with immediate
feedbacks that facilitate learning (Thaler and Ziemba, 1988, Erev and Haruvy, 2010). Hence
the presence of unexploited prot opportunities is instructive about the degree of e¢ ciency
and participantsrationality in information markets.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data, Section 3 presents
the expected return to bets at di¤erent odds. Section 4 investigates the protability of a
simple price-based betting rule. Section 5 analyzes to what extent protability is a¤ected
by transaction costs. Next, Section 6 tests the robustness of the betting rule and Section
7 estimates which fraction of their wealth risk averse bettors would dedicate to wagering.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Description of the dataset
The dataset comprises the results of 79,446 football matches played in national championships
of 11 European countries between 2000 and 2011, together with the odds against each possible
outcome (home win, away win, even) and the date of the matches. All data can be freely
downloaded from the website football.data.co.uk. The championships covered by this resource
are the top four leagues of England and Scotland, the top two leagues of Germany, Italy, Spain
and France, and the top leagues of Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Turkey and Greece. All
championships are present in the dataset as soon as 2000.
To avoid selection bias and to dispose of the largest dataset, all championships and years
recorded by the website are used in the sequel (except the fth league of England whose
data only begin in 2005). Betting odds data are quoted by 12 online bookmakers accessible
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to British gamblers3 . Appendix A indicates the number of matches present in the dataset
broken down by seasons and bookmakers. Five online bookmakers are recorded the rst
season 2000-1. Their number gradually increases to 10 for more recent seasons. The records
of several competing bookmakers allow us to use two types of odds for every match outcome:
the best odds recorded in the dataset and the mean odd which is the arithmetic mean of all
odds quoted for a given outcome.
3 The mean return to bets at di¤erent odds
This section investigates the expected return to bets placed at various ranges of odd. All
seasons, championships and odds status are pooled. For every match outcome the best odd
available in the market is selected. Figure 1 plots average rates of return of bets with similar
odds along with their 95% condence interval. Appendix B provides detailed information
about how the graph is constructed.
<Insert Figure 1>
Returns displayed in Fig. 1 are computed with best odds but a similar prole translated
downward would obtain if mean odds were used instead. Two important observations are
in order. First, a favourite longshot bias is observed. Return tends to decrease with odds
although the relationship is somewhat noisy and seem to disappear for odds greater than 3.5.
This pattern is consistent with several theories. If bettors have expected utility preferences,
the odd-return relationship reveals risk loving (Quandt, 1986). A similar pattern would arise
if bettors depreciate small probabilities as in Prospect Theory (e.g. Snowberg and Wolfers,
forthcoming). Last, if a subset of bettors benet from private information, bookmakers may
3These bookmakers are Bet365, Blue Square, Bwin, Gamebookers, Interwetten, Ladbrokes, Sportingbet,
Sporting Odds, Stan James, Stanleybet, Victor Chandler and William Hill. They are all well-established
online bookmakers except Sporting Odds which has ceased its activity.
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attempt to protect themselves by lowering the return to betting on longshots. Shin (1991,
1992) shows that the presence of insider traders generates a favourite-longshot bias in xed
odds markets. Note however that a decreasing relationship between odds and return for the
longest odds is not a feature of our data.
Second, the rst odds intervals display a positive return. Bets with odds less than 1.21
yield a return of around 4% (see Table B in Appendix B for more details). The condence
interval indicates that the true return is positive with a probability greater than 95 %. In
addition, Table B in Appendix B shows that the probability is actually greater than 99%
for bets whose odds is smaller than 1.17. Hence backing overwhelmingly favourites whose
probability of winning is around 90% guarantees a positive and statistically robust rate of
return. If mean odds are selected instead of best odds, average returns are still around 2%
for odds less than 1.21 but are less statistically robust (Table B in Appendix B). The 95%
condence interval includes strictly positive returns only for odds smaller than 1.17.
The presence of protable bets casts serious doubt on the ability of the market to aggregate
all relevant information about the likelihood of match outcomes. To the contrary, the evidence
suggests that protable opportunities are not exploited away by bettors and that bookmakers
do not x odds in a rational way, contrary to what Levit (2004) shows in the American
National Football League gambling market. By severely underpricing bets with the smallest
odds, bookmakers expose themselves to potentially large losses. From a bettors perspective,
it is however not straightforward how easy this pricing bias may be exploited. The rest of the
article investigates this question by analyzing the protability of a simple betting strategy
which consists in backing all results whose odds is smaller than a threshold.
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4 A simple betting rule
Table 1 shows the rates of return when bettors back all bets whose odds are less or equal to
various thresholds. Statistics are computed for the whole sample. The threshold applies to
best odds regardless bettors select the best odd or the mean odd. For mean odds, one may
think of bettors who bet upon observing the best odds in the market, yet use their regular
bookmaker to place a stake.
<Insert Table 1>
The return prole is hump-shaped both for best odds and mean odds. The rate of return
is increasing for odds between 1.14 and 1.19 due to a stable win frequency around 91.5%.
Betting all outcomes whose odds are inferior to the cut-o¤ 1.19 yields a maximum return of
4.45% if best odds are chosen and 2.78% if mean odds are selected. This rule implies backing
661 bets over 11 seasons, or on average 60 bets per season. Notice that all strategies based
on a price threshold between 1.17 and 1.21 yield a return greater than 4%. Hence bettors
may not choose the best cuto¤, yet benet from a rate of return close to the maximum one.
Table 1 also shows that bets with odds smaller than 1.16 deliver a sub-optimal return.
A more sophisticated strategy would therefore consist in backing all bets whose odds are
between 1.16 and 1.19. This would yield a return of 7.20% with best odds and 5.26% with
mean odds. A one-threshold strategy is however maintained in the following in order to keep
the betting rule as simple as possible.
Rates of return in Table 1 apply to a very short time period. Bettors typically place a
stake Saturday and can withdraw their money the next week. To ease the comparison with
nancial investments, annualized rates of return are computed by backtesting the betting
rule on historical data. Bettors are assumed to face actual betting opportunities, to stake
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£ 1 on every bet whose odd is less or equal to a given threshold and to reinvest the proceeds
whenever possible. The gains are withdrawn from the betting account once a year at the end
of each season. An annual rate of return is then calculated for every season from summer to
next summer.
More formally, let us denote st the amount of money placed in the account balance until
the betting period t = 1; : : : ; T and gt the account balance which is st plus previous gains
and losses from past bets. st and gt evolve over a season according to:
st = st 1 +min(gt 1   nt; 0)
gt = gt 1 +
ntX
i=1
qi  1i   nt
with 1i equal to 1 if bet i is successful and 0 otherwise. nt is the number of simultaneous
bets that meet the betting criterion and belong to the same betting period. A betting period
includes all bets that happen within three consecutive days during which we assume that
gains reinvestment is not possible. Bettors contribute to their account the sum st   st 1
whenever the balance account gt 1 is insu¢ cient to stake the sum nt. End-of-season rate of
return is gT =sT   1. Table 2 indicates annualized rates of return for odd threshold varying
from 1.15 to 1.26.
<Insert Table 2>
For every threshold, we rst compute annual rates of return for the 11 seasons and then
take the geometric mean. Backing outcomes whose odds are less or equal to 1.21 maximizes
the rate of return both for the strategy involving best odds and the one with mean odds.
For this threshold, 1111 bets meet the criterion. Given a unit stake of £ 1, the average total
stake over a season is £ 4.80 with best odd, and the average end-of-season gain is £ 9.90. This
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translates into an average rate of return of 106%. The optimal threshold is slightly di¤erent
from 1.19 which is the cuto¤ found with the instant return criterion. Overall, the pattern is
similar albeit with a di¤erent scale, which comes from the opportunity given to bettors to
capitalize instant rates of return by reinvesting the proceeds each week.
5 Information and transaction costs
Two betting strategies have been distinguished. Bettors may stick with their regular betting
website or they may shop around in search of best odds. The protability of these two
options has been evaluated by computing rates of return with mean odds and best odds
respectively. Information and transactions costs might however inhibit bettors from exploiting
prot opportunities documented in the previous section.
A casual internet search uncovers many websites specialized in free odds comparisons.
Hence shopping around for best odds do not entail signicant search costs. Transaction costs
depend on the payment mode. Bettors may deposit money into their betting account using
a bank card, bank transfer or a money transfer site. A card deposit is credited instantly into
the account. Some online betting sites do not charge anything for card deposits, while others
charge a fee of a few per cent on the amount deposited, which is detrimental to the return to
betting.
Bank transfers are free of charge both in cases of deposit and withdrawal. Transferring
funds may take from 3 to 5 business days4 . This is a good solution for bettors who choose
to place bets in their regular bookmaker. It is less convenient if they want to shop around
for best odds. As odds are typically posted Wednesday for next weekend matches, delays of
transfer may be too long to take advantage of the best odds proposed by bookmakers. The
4 If the money is transferred to a foreign bank, delays may be longer and transfers not free of charge.
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use of a money transfer site is more appropriate in this case.
Money transfer sites (MTS) are third party intermediaries that make easy and cost ef-
fective for bettors to manage their online betting payments. Bettors make a single deposit
into their account and then allocate the money to di¤erent bookmakers. Deposits into the
MTS account by bank transfer is free. Payments to bookmakers are made instantly. Table 3
presents the fee structure of two commonly used MTS, Moneybookers and Neteller.
Table 3. The cost of using two money transfer sites
Moneybookers Neteller
Deposits by bank transfer free free
Withdrawal by bank transfers £ 1.48 £ 5
Transfers of money to bookmakers 1%, up to £ 0.41 free
Receiving money from bookmakers free free
Assuming that bettors commit to their betting strategy over a complete season, Table 4
shows how annualized rates of return similar to the ones computed in Table 2 for a threshold
of 1.21 vary when transaction costs are taken into account.
Table 4. Annualized rates of return for £ 10 and £ 100 unit stakes (whole sample)
No transaction costs Moneybookers Neteller
Unit stake irrelevant £ 10 £ 100 £ 10 £ 100
Return (%) 106.11 75.06 94.74 93.01 104.81
Bettors are assumed to switch to a di¤erent bookmaker and pay the transfer fee every
time a bet meeting the criterion appears. In practice several bets appearing in a row may be
proposed by the same bookmaker, lowering the payment costs. Hence Table 4 provides an
upper bound for the impact of transaction costs to return when bettors use Moneybookers.
Flat fees make a signicant dent in rates of return for small stakes. They are less visible
for a £ 100 unit stake and would become negligible for higher stakes. They stay in all cases
above the annualized rate of return of 52.54% obtained by using mean odds (Table 2). Over
a typical season, bettors face 102 bets whose odd is less or equal to 1.21. With a £ 100 unit
stake and prot reinvestment, they place a total of £ 440. At the end of the season their gains
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are up to £ 819 with Moneybookers and £ 857 with Neteller. The impact of transaction costs
on protability depends on the size of stakes. We will see in Section 7 that even risk averse
bettors stake a signicant fraction of their wealth, so that transaction costs are no more an
issue.
6 Robustness tests
Previous rates of return are computed for the whole period which includes 11 seasons. It is
possible that protability were high during the rst seasons and then gradually disappears
as more and more gamblers bet on shortest odds. Bookmakers may also have realized by
themselves their risk exposure and adjusted downward their smallest odds before incurring
signicant losses. In both cases, a declining protability should be observed the latest seasons.
Alternatively, positive returns could be for some reasons concentrated in the latest years so
that bettors and bookmakers have lacked hindsight to notice and exploit the pattern. Table
5 shows that none of these scenarios are observed.
<Insert Table 5>
Rates of return are not decreasing over time. To the contrary, returns follow a slightly
increasing trend with the last three seasons among the best ones. The pattern is however
visible as soon as the rst season. Instant rates of return are positive 10 seasons over 11 with
best odds and 9 seasons over 10 with mean odds. Hence nearly 11 years of high protability
have not been consistently exploited by bettors.
High rates of return have been obtained by using a price threshold computed over the
11 seasons. One may ask whether high returns persist if the price threshold is computed
by using price information available at the beginning of each season. For a given season, it
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amounts to nding the threshold that maximizes the return between the beginning of the
rst season recorded in the sample and the end of the previous season, and then to applying
this threshold to next seasons. Table 6 shows for each season the optimal threshold computed
over past seasons (third column), the corresponding rate of return for the in-sample period
(forth column), the rate of return if this threshold is used the next season (fth column) and
the rate of return if it is used for the rest of the seasons (sixth column).
<Insert Table 6>
Optimal thresholds do not vary much when the in-sample period is extended forward,
except when the season 2006-7 is added with a threshold falling from 1.24 to 1.19. Instant
rates of return are equal to 4.33% on average with one year of negative return. Interestingly,
updating the threshold each year is dominated on average by the strategy which uses the
same threshold for the rest of the seasons with a mean return of 5.04%. This result suggests
that fully updating the odd threshold after every season is not optimal. As expected, using
real-time data instead of ex post data to compute the optimal threshold reduces the instant
rate of return but only from 5.01% (average return in Table 5) to 4.33%.
Appendix C presents the same statistics with mean odds instead of best odds. The next-
season average rate of returns is still 2.90% instead of 4.33% with best odds. Keeping the
same threshold for the rest of the seasons yields an instant mean return of 3.29% compared
to 3.34% when the entire sample is used to compute the odd threshold (Table 5).
7 Optimal staking
Selecting the shortest odds is highly protable but also highly risky. For the class of bets
under consideration, bettors may lose their entire stake with a probability of around 10%. Risk
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might therefore deter bettors from taking advantage of these return opportunities. To check
this possibility, we assume that bettors have expected utility (EU) preferences and concave
utility. We do not claim that such preferences apply to the majority of active bettors. To
the contrary, the average bettor may be risk loving and fall prey to the same behavioural
biases that are observed in nancial markets, like overcondence (Barber and Odean, 2001)
or the hindsight bias (Biais and Weber, 2009). Yet the operation of a minority of rational
bettors who detect and exploit return deviations may su¢ ce to guarantee market e¢ ciency.
If any, these arbitragers should treat probabilities in a rational manner and consequently be
EU decision-makers. Note that assuming risk averse EU bettors minimizes the risk to reject
incorrectly the e¢ cient market hypothesis. High-risk-high-return bets would obviously t risk
loving bettorspreferences.
EU investors put a strictly positive fraction of their wealth in an asset as soon as its rate
of return exceeds the safe interest rate (e.g. Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). As a result, we
do not test whether risk averse bettors participate to the betting market but rather what
fraction of their wealth they should invest in a given bet. A fraction invested close to zero
would support the e¢ cient market argument according to which risk prevents arbitragers
from eliminating return anomalies.
A simple asset allocation problem is solved and calibrated using empirical values. Betting
opportunities are modelled as follows. Let us consider a bet which odd is q and probability of
success p. Several classes of bets with similar odds are distinguished. Their probabilities of




There are eight classes of odds which range from 1.13 to 1.21 for best odds and 1.11 to 1.21
for mean odds. All classes are protable with average instant rates of return between 0.31%
and 9.97%. The last column indicates the theoretical rate of return if bets were perfectly
homogenous in each class. They are not very di¤erent from average returns, suggesting that
bet classes are close to be homogenous despite di¤erent odd values included in each class.
Bets are evaluated by EU bettors with isoelastic utility function: u(c) = c1 =(1   ),
where  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient (RRAC). Bettors wealth before gambling
is denoted w. The amount of money placed on a single bet is denoted . Given the very
short period over which a bet is pending, money is the sole alternative investment considered,
which interest rate is zero. In such an environment with a zero risk-free interest rate, no serial
correlation of rates of return5 and an isoelastic utility function, it is rational to bet at each
period as if the current betting period were the last one (Mossin, 1968). This property greatly
simplies the investment problem. The amount  maximizes bettors expected utility:
 = argmax pu(w   + q) + (1  p)u(w   )
The optimal stake in proportion to wealth =w is derived with p and q replaced by their
empirical counterparts documented in Table 7. The problem at hand is however only valid
for a single bet. 60 bets meeting the betting criterion on average each season, many bets are
actually placed during the same weekend. Over the 11 seasons, only 190 bets, or 29% of total
bets, come in isolation during a betting period, 186 bets come in pair, 147 by three, 76 by
four, 50 by ve and 12 by six. Backing several bets at once is a natural way to diversify risk.
This is why optimal stakes are also calculated when more than one bet are taken at the same
5The correlation coe¢ cient between the rate of return and the previous period one is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero at a 10% condence level.
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time. The corresponding maximization programs are presented in Appendix D.
Table 8 displays optimal stakes in proportion to wealth =w for various degrees of risk
aversion. Four odd classes taken from Table 7 are compared which di¤er in their instant rate
of return. Three di¤erent values for the RRAC are considered. Although most calibrated
studies, notably in the equity premium literature, take a RRAC between 1 and 5, we also
consider a value of 10 to test resultsrobustness. Such a value implies that bettors would be
ready to pay as much as 4.42% to escape the risk of gaining or losing 10% of their wealth.
For simplicity, it is also assumed that when several bets come together, they share the same
characteristics in terms of probability and odd.
<Insert Table 8>
As expected, the fraction of wealth dedicated to betting is decreasing with the degree of
risk aversion and increasing with the expected rate of return and the number of simultaneous
bets. The presence of concomitant bets goes a long way toward mitigating risk. Betting on
two bets instead of one roughly doubles the fraction invested in wagering. The fraction of
wealth gambled is not trivial. In the worst case scenario, a single bet with an expected return
of 0.44% and a RRAC of 10, bettors still commit 0.5% of their wealth to gambling. With
more than one bet, a smaller RRAC or better rates of return, this fraction rapidly reaches
high fractions of wealth for realistic betting opportunities. We conclude from these results
that risk should not deter most EU bettors from investing a signicant proportion of their
wealth in the betting market.
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8 Conclusion
Online betting markets are becoming a global industry which attracts an increasing number
of rms and bettors around the world. Gamblers can choose between many bookmakers
and easily shop around for best odds. Yet, despite a highly competitive market, this article
provides evidence of large deviations from weak-form e¢ ciency. It is shown that systematically
picking out the shortest odds delivers an instant rate of return of 4.45% or an annualized rate
of return of 106%. Such a betting rule does not require a complex forecasting model. The
return is robust to out-of-sample tests and to the use of real-time data. Bettors with realistic
degrees of risk aversion are still willing to devote a signicant fraction of their wealth to
wagering. Transaction costs take the form of small at fees which can be recouped by stakes
large enough.
Our data conrm the presence of a favourite-longshot bias found in other betting markets.
Rates of return to betting fall as the odds rise. The bias is large enough to produce a positive
return rate when overwhelmingly favourites are backed. This deviation from e¢ ciency involves
both sides of the market. Bettors have failed so far to respond to the presence of protable
bets and bookmakers have put their business at risk by underpricing bets with the smallest
odds.
By focusing on simple strategies, these results do not make full use of all available informa-
tion. We have already noticed that discarding the odds below 1.16 would enhance the return
rate. In addition, the odd threshold could be adapted for each country or league. It could also
depend on whether the odds hold for the home team or the away team. Other improvements
would consist in exploiting possible serial correlations of wins or adopting a betting strategy
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Appendix A : Sample summary statistics
Table A presents summary statistics about the number of odds present in the data broken
down by seasons and bookmakers.
<Insert Table A>
Table reads as follows. The results of 7,095 football matches have been recorded during
the season 2000-1, among which 5,542 have odds from the bookmaker Gamebookers. The
same year, we dispose of 25,557 triplets of odds (one for each possible match outcome) quoted
by ve bookmakers. The total number of odds recorded in 2000-1 is therefore 76,671.
Appendix B : Computation of Figure 1
The sample includes 79,446 football matches from 21 national championships played in
12 European countries over the period 2000-2011. Our dataset has a quasi-continuum of
odds generally quoted with a two digit accuracy, except for longer odds. We group together
results with similar odds to produce reliable estimates of return. Our grouping algorithm
starts from the smallest odds and add bets with identical or increasing odds in each bracket
until the number of bets is greater than a threshold x. The threshold is a balance between
statistical signicance and keeping groups homogenous. Bets with the shortest odds being
21
less frequent, a smaller x is needed to make apparent their protability. x is equal to 2000 for
the whole sample, except in the left-hand part of the spectrum where bets are less numerous:
x equals 500 for odds strictly smaller than 1:30. Table B summarizes relevant statistics for
the computation of returns and condence intervals. It only indicates the rst three bins,
or the rst three points in the gure, which are the most important for the purpose of our





j=1 qj  1WIN   1 with m the number of bets in a class, qj the odd of
bet j, and 1WIN an index equal to one if the bet is successful. Condence intervals around
average return is given by  qpfn(1  fn)=pn with q the mean odd of the class, fn the win
frequency, and  = 1:65 for a 90% condence level, 1:96 for a 95% condence level and 2:57
for a 99% condence level. The condence interval is the same for best odds and mean odds
due to the assumption that a bet is triggered as soon as a best odd is inferior to the threshold
regardless bettors earn the best odd or the mean odd. For mean odds, we can think of bettors
who compare odds of di¤erent bookmakers but keep their regular bookmaker to place a bet.
Di¤erent grouping methods or di¤erent thresholds would produce slightly di¤erent results
without altering the main properties in Figure 1.




Table C indicates the annual rate or return of backing all bets whose odds are less or
equal to a threshold by using real-time data and mean odds.
Appendix D : Money allocation problems with multiple bets
This appendix shows money allocation problems when bettors place more than one bet
during a betting period. Let p be the probability of winning the bet, q the odd, w bettors
wealth and  the amount of money wagered. The bettors problem with two simultaneous
and independent bets is:
 = argmax p2u(w   2+ 2q) + 2p(1  p)u(w   2+ q) + (1  p)2u(w   2).
Bettors face a probability p2 of winning the two bets, a probability 2p(1  p) of winning
only one bet and (1   p)2 of losing their entire stake. The money allocation problem with
three bets is:
 = argmax p3u(w   3+ 3q) + 3p2(1  p)u(w   3+ 2q)
+3p(1  p)2u(w   3+ q) + (1  p)3u(w   3),
and with four bets :
 = argmax p4u(w   4+ 4q) + 4p3(1  p)u(w   4+ 3q)
+6p2(1  p)2u(w   4+ 2q) + 4p(1  p)3u(w   4+ q) + (1  p)4u(w   4).
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Notes: Sample includes odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European countries from 2000 to 
2011. A 95 % confidence interval is added. 
 
 
















1.13 204 185 90.69 0.14 -1.09 
1.14 241 220 91.29 1.32 0.00 
1.15 409 373 91.20 2.71 1.21 
1.16 444 407 91.67 3.50 1.94 
1.17 614 562 91.53 4.37 2.72 
1.18 659 602 91.35 4.40 2.73 
1.19 661 604 91.38 4.45 2.78 
1.20 1111 993 89.38 4.16 2.32 
1.21 1118 999 89.36 4.15 2.33 
1.22 1417 1243 87.72 3.19 1.31 
1.23 1452 1277 87.95 3.47 1.58 
1.24 1455 1280 87.97 3.61 1.72 
1.25 2107 1791 85.00 1.86 -0.16 
1.26 2115 1798 85.01 1.90 -0.12 
1.27 2179 1845 84.67 1.64 -0.39 
Notes: Table indicates various statistics for betting rules consisting in backing all bets whose odds are 
less or equal to a threshold. Sample includes odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European 
countries from 2000 to 2011. 




Return with best 
odds (%) 
Return with 
mean odds (%) 
1.15 33.71 15.94 
1.16 45.79 23.50 
1.17 71.96 39.42 
1.18 78.73 43.94 
1.19 77.47 43.18 
1.20 103.54 51.79 
1.21 106.11 52.54 
1.22 63.11 22.96 
1.23 76.66 33.50 
1.24 79.91 35.68 
1.25 33.78 -4.03 
1.26 35.34 -3.19 
Notes: Table shows the rates of return with best and mean odds for betting rules consisting in backing 
all bets whose odds are less or equal to a threshold. Sample includes odds of 79,446 football matches 




Table 5. Instant rates of return by seasons (betting threshold of 1.19, no transaction costs) 
 




Win frequency Instant return 
with best odds 
Instant return with 
mean odds 
2000:1 50 45 90.00  3.24  2.01 
2001:2 42 39 92.86  5.53  4.22 
2002:3 76 68 89.47  1.66  0.30 
2003:4 91 84 92.31  4.49  2.93 
2004:5 79 68 86.08 -2.05 -3.56 
2005:6 64 60 93.75  8.27  6.07 
2006:7 74 67 90.54  3.61  1.70 
2007:8 42 37 88.10  1.36 -0.38 
2008:9 31 30 96.77 12.39 10.55 
2009:0 62 59 95.16  8.79  6.81 
2010:1 50 47 94.00 7.8 6.08 
Mean 60.10 54.91 91.73  5.01  3.34 
Notes: Table indicates various statistics broken down by season for betting rules consisting in backing 
all bets whose odds are less or equal to 1.19. Mean is unweighted arithmetic mean. Sample includes 
odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European countries from 2000 to 2011. 
 








of return over 
[2000:t] 
Out-of-sample 
rates of return 
over [t:t+1] 
Out-of-sample 
rates of return 
over [t:2011] 
2000:1 2001 1.21 5.84 7.50 4.00 
2000:2 2002 1.21 6.64 2.54 3.68 
2000:3 2003 1.24 5.76 4.14 2.93 
2000:4 2004 1.24 5.22 0.57 2.70 
2000:5 2005 1.24 4.14 3.60 3.14 
2000:6 2006 1.24 4.04 -1.95 3.03 
2000:7 2007 1.19 3.28 1.36 7.44 
2000:8 2008 1.21 3.22 8.98 7.32 
2000:9 2009 1.19 3.65 8.79 8.35 
2000:10 2010 1.19 4.17 7.80 7.80 
Mean  1.21 4.60 4.33 5.04 
Notes: Table shows instant rates of return under various scenarios. Column 1 indicates period over 
which optimal threshold is computed; column 2 last year of in-sample seasons, column 3 optimal 
threshold over the specified period; column 4 in-sample average instant rate of return; column 5 
average instant rate of return obtained by applying the threshold over the next season; column 6 
average instant rate of return by using the same threshold until the last season. Mean is unweighted 
arithmetic mean. Sample includes odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European countries 








Range of odds Mean odd 
(q) 





best [1.13 – 1.15[ 1.137 61 0.9672 9.975 9.985 
best [1.15 – 1.17[ 1.153 214 0.9159 5.592 5.588 
best [1.17 – 1.18[ 1.170 154 0.9156 7.123 7.123 
best [1.18 – 1.21[ 1.198 497 0.8672 3.896 3.901 
mean [1.11 – 1.13[ 1.120 135 0.9333 4.531 4.508 
mean [1.13 – 1.15[ 1.140 222 0.9144 4.253 4.264 
mean [1.15 – 1.17] 1.159 275 0.8655 0.311 0.307 
mean [1.17 – 1.18[ 1.174 155 0.8774 3.040 3.045 
mean [1.18 – 1.21[ 1.195 589 0.8404 0.440 0.445 
Notes: Table indicates various statistics for different odd classes. Last column indicates theoretical rate 
of return if bets were perfectly homogenous in each class. Sample includes odds of 79,446 football 
matches played in 11 European countries from 2000 to 2011. 
 
Table 8. Fraction of wealth gambled in percent as a function of the number of simultaneous bets and 
for different degrees of risk aversion (no transaction costs) 
 
Relative risk aversion coefficient Odds Odd type Instant rate 
of return 
Number 
of bets σ  = 1.5 σ  = 5 σ  = 10 
1 54.47 20.54 10.79 
2 90.24 40.56 21.52 
3 99.08 59.88 32.17 
[1.13 – 1.15[ Best odds 9.97% 
4 99.91 80.14 44.12 
1 25.96 8.51 4.33 
2 50.93 16.99 8.67 
3 74.59 25.45 13.00 [1.15 – 1.17[ Best odds 5.92% 
4 96.90 36.58 18.66 
1 11.97 3.73 1.88 
2 23.86 7.45 3.75 
3 35.67 11.17 5.63 [1.17 – 1.18[ Mean odds 3.04% 
4 57.72 18.15 9.15 
1 3.36 1.02 0.51 
2 6.72 2.04 1.02 
3 10.09 3.06 1.53 [1.18 – 1.21[ Mean odds 0.44% 
4 26.43 8.06 4.04 
Notes: Sample includes odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European countries from 2000 to 
2011. Table reads as follows. Bettors with a relative risk aversion coefficient of 1.5 invest 54.47% of 
their wealth in a bet whose odd is 1.137 and probability of winning is 96.72%. Odds and win 
probabilities are displayed in Table 7 for best odds ranging from 1.13 to 1.15. Likewise, the third 
column instant rate of return of 9.97% is the mean return computed in Table 7 for the class of bets 
[1.13 – 1.15[. Faced with two simultaneous bets whose odds are 1.137 and probabilities of winning 




Table A. Number of matches quoted by bookmakers every year 
 
























Nb M 7095 7039 7137 7340 7329 7324 7258 7258 7258 7117 7191 79446 
GB 5542 5245 6988 7209 7302 7305 7252 7247 7243 7087 7169 75589 
IW 6153 6297 6378 6797 7172 7189 7193 7121 7195 6980 7113 75588 
LB 3169 3694 4597 5044 6784 7000 7020 7146 7183 7077 7152 65866 
SB 4883 4327 6871 7073 7256 7278 7230 7228 7229 7038 7104 73517 
WH 5810 6047 6466 6959 6980 7257 7235 5166 7211 7061 7183 73375 
ST  5565          5565 
BE    6844 7135 7303 7250 7251 7250 7093 7180 57306 
SO   3147 3603        6750 
BW     7274 7301 7252 7252 7238 7054 7170 50541 
SJ      7291 7216 7243 7219 7027 7093 43089 
VC      7138 7154 7209 7210 7082 7139 42932 
BS        7236 7235 7070 7116 28657 
Nb B 5 6 6 7 7 9 9 10 10 10 10 12 
Total 1 25557 31175 34447 43529 49903 65062 64802 70099 72213 70569 71419 598775 
Legend: Nb M: number of matches, GB = Gamebookers, IW = Interwetten, LB = Ladbrokes, SB = 
Sportingbet, WH = William Hill, ST = Stanley bet, BE = bet365, SO = Sporting Odds, BW = Bwin, SJ 
= Stan James, VC = Victor Chandler, BS = Blue Square; Nb B : number of recorded bookmakers; 
Total 1: number of match-bookmaker couples by season; Total 2: number of match-bookmaker 












Instant return (%) Confidence interval 
 Best odds Mean odds 90% 95 % 99% 
[1 – 1.17[ 614 91.53 4.37 2.72 +/- 2.01 +/- 2.39 +/- 3.13 
[1.17 – 1.21[ 504 86.71 3.90 1.84 +/- 2.97 +/- 3.53 +/- 4.62 
[1.21 – 1.25[ 989 80.09 -0.73 -2.96 +/- 2.58 +/- 3.06 +/- 4.01 
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for backing all bets whose odds are included in odd brackets. 
Sample includes odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European countries from 2000 to 2011. 








of return over 
[2000:t] 
Out-of-sample 
rates of return 
over [t:t+1] 
Out-of-sample 
rates of return 
over [t:2011] 
2000:1 2001 1.21 4.32 6.12 2.15 
2000:2 2002 1.21 5.19 1.01 1.78 
2000:3 2003 1.24 4.21 2.29 0.93 
2000:4 2004 1.24 3.57 1.22 0.67 
2000:5 2005 1.24 2.45 1.21 1.07 
2000:6 2006 1.24 2.24 -3.90 1.04 
2000:7 2007 1.17 1.74 -2.14 5.51 
2000:8 2008 1.19 1.51 10.54 7.36 
2000:9 2009 1.17 2.04 6.54 6.31 
2000:10 2010 1.19 2.51 6.10 6.10 
mean  1.21 2.98 2.90 3.29 
Notes: Table shows instant rates of return for various scenarios. Column 1 indicates period over which 
optimal threshold is computed; column 2 last year of in-sample seasons, column 3 optimal threshold 
over the specified period; column 4 in-sample average instant rate of return; column 5 average instant 
rate of return obtained by applying the threshold over the next season; column 6 average instant rate of 
return by using the same threshold until the last season. Mean is unweighted arithmetic mean. Sample 
includes odds of 79,446 football matches played in 11 European countries from 2000 to 2011. 
